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Abstract 
 This thesis reviews the major theoretical frameworks and their outlook on the 
government spending, its effectiveness, the implied size of the multiplier and how they 
differed in empirical studies. This is followed by an estimation of the government 
multiplier for the major U.S. fiscal policy, namely the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA), after the Great Recession of 2007-2009. Own estimation of 
the size of the multiplier is presented using a standard SVAR model based on New 
Keynesian approach for time period between 2009 and 2018. In addition, following the 
classical economic theory, the multiplier is recalculated in the absence of Finance, 
Insurance, and Real Estate (FIRE) sector which is considered to be unproductive sector 
since it does not add value according to the classical theory. I find the multiplier to be 
below unity during this period with the exception when the FIRE industries are excluded. 
Key Words: government spending multiplier, fiscal policy, monetary policy, history of 
economic thought, econometrics. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
In recent days, the government spending multiplier got into the spotlight of the 
economists and the general public. The Great Recession in the late 2000s proved to be the 
accelerator for research and interest in this topic as with monetary policy being 
constrained by zero interest rates, policymakers decided to turn to the fiscal policy to 
fine-tune the economy. This action, however, was not without its controversy as a share 
of the politicians, economists and the general public found an expansive fiscal policy to 
be adverse to the economy. The main disagreement was about whether the government 
spending multiplier is higher than unity or not. To resolve this issue, many economists 
decided to estimate the size of the multiplier; however, their efforts never really helped to 
settle this problem. The results showed a wide range of estimates that would vary from 
high multipliers, larger than 2, to multipliers close to zero. This heterogeneity is the result 
of the complexity of the multiplier as there are many variables that affect it such as the 
state of the economy, the type of the spending shock or the methodology and assumptions 
that were used. A better understanding of this topic and a general agreement on how 
fiscal policy should be enacted would help with a more efficient and effective 
government spending that would not only save taxpayers' money but would also have the 
ability to support the economy, reduce the harm of downturns and keep the economy 
longer on track of expansion.
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The idea of the government spending multiplier started back in the 19th century; 
however, the generally accepted originator of this concept was John Maynard Keynes. 
Keynes, through his general framework, claimed that government spending is beneficial 
as people behave and spend their money based on their current income. Such a 
conclusion leads to a higher multiplier. Keynes found a lot of opponents, especially after 
the Second World War, who claimed that people behave on a rational basis and therefore 
will use this additional spending for future purposes, be it future tax expenditure or to 
smooth their consumption. This dilemma led economists to test this on real-life data and 
see the size of the multiplier for themselves. Despite that, there is no consensus on the 
horizon due to the complexity of this topic and the fact that there is more than just 
multiplier. 
In my undergraduate thesis (Focht, 2016), I analyzed the size of the multiplier 
from a mainstream perspective by using the model first introduced to the 
macroeconomics sphere by Gorodnichenko and Lee (2017) and Ramey and Zubairy 
(2018). By applying Jorda’s local projections model along with defense spending as the 
shock variable, I estimate the multipliers over three different states of the economy; 
expansion, recession, and Zero Lower Bound. I found the multipliers to be constant and 
lower than unity. In this work, I aim to use the knowledge about alternate frameworks 
gained from my graduate studies and compare them with more traditional framework, 
how they compare, where they differ, and how their assumptions and methodologies 
affect the size of the multiplier. Secondly, the Great Recession was started by a crisis 
inside the FIRE sector1, therefore, I decided to use the work by Duncan Foley (2011) and 
 
1 FIRE industries = Finance, Insurance, Real Estate Industries 
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test the new Keynesian theories with a twist by employing a classical-Keynesian 
approach and excluding the FIRE sector to estimate the size of the multiplier. After the 
crash of 2008, Foley made estimates of by how much the GDP should fall and how high 
the unemployment should get. Later he found, that the drop in output was not as severe as 
he predicted, however, he was fairly correct when it came to the unemployment rate, 
therefore, he asked himself a question why that was so. Foley used a classical-Keynesian 
approach, going back to Adam Smith and David Ricardo and their differentiation 
between “productive” and “unproductive” labor and Marx’s “surplus value”, to answer 
this question by dividing the economy into two sectors; the FIRE sector (as unproductive 
sector of the economy) and the rest of the economy (as productive). The reason why did 
so was twofold. First, FIRE is considered an unproductive sector of the economy in the 
classical sense, that is, it does not create or add value. Second, related to the first point,  
the issue of “imputation”. Foley realized that the FIRE sector is handled differently when 
it comes to the calculation of the GDP as there are no independent measures of the value 
added by these industries ( for other industries, it is the revenue from sales minus the cost 
of purchased inputs excluding new investment and labor). On the contrary, the national 
accounts impute the value added by in the FIRE sector by equaling it to the income 
generated. Also, as Foley shows, the national accounts consider the difference between 
interest received and interest paid by the FIRE industries as a value added by them, which 
increased due to the monetary easing during the Great Recession. He finds the imputation 
not to be an accurate representation of the value added as there is a weaker relationship 
between employment and value added, between sales and value added, and in general 
inflates the size of the economy and its growth rate.  
 4 
I decided to test his ideas and test how they would affect the size of the multiplier 
if we looked at the industries outside of the FIRE sector. The underlying logic for the 
non-FIRE multiplier is that using classical school’s measure of value added should lead 
to more accurate estimates of the multiplier and the effects of fiscal policy. Secondly, as 
Foley showed, the recession was more severe if FIRE is excluded, therefore, I test 
whether the multiplier is higher than it would be for the entire economy in the absence of 
FIRE sector. In my work, I employ the model created by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) 
and expand it by including interest rate and the use of value added without FIRE 
industries. Later, I also test two different transformations of elasticities to multipliers.  
Chapter 2 contains a review of the theoretical frameworks by Keynes, Friedman, 
Modigliani, Hall, and New Keynesian economists. I show the differences between their 
main assumptions, policy conclusions, and the implied size of the multiplier. In Chapter 
3, I create a summary of empirical research. I divide this into four sections, state-
independent multipliers, cyclical multipliers, zero lower bound multipliers, and 
multipliers after the ARRA. I explain the theoretical side of how large these multipliers 
should be and then make a general summary of the results. In Chapter 4, I focus on how 
methodology and assumptions create a difference. First, I focus on the methodology side. 
I present the two main models that are currently being used, time series and DSGE 
models and show the difference in their estimations. In the assumption part, I present six 
different assumptions that can affect the size of the multiplier.  
In Chapter 5, I present my methodology as I use an SVAR model based on 
Cholesky decomposition following Blanchard and Perotti (2002). In Chapter 6, I show 
my results. I estimate my multipliers by using the model created by Blanchard and Perotti 
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(2002) and then expanding it by adding two variables, interest rate and value added 
without the FIRE industries to test whether the same methodology will lead to similar 
results and how excluding the FIRE industries will affect the size of the multiplier. 
Chapter 7 provides a summary of empirical work with some concluding remarks.
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Frameworks 
2.1 John Maynard Keynes 
Although the government spending multiplier, and fiscal multiplier in general, is 
mostly related to John Maynard Keynes, one can trace its origins even further in the past. 
The first substantial work on this topic can be seen in the work of an Australian 
economist Alfredo De Lissa (Goodwin, 1962). In his work, De Lissa followed the 
Australian economy going from the 1880s through the 1900s when Australia was going 
through an expansion, and he attempted to analyze the impact of staple-producing 
industries on the economy. However, the first one to bring this issue into the light of 
mainstream discussion was Richard Kahn, who worked with John Maynard Keynes. 
Kahn was the first one to put down a clear theoretical and analytical description of the 
government spending multiplier in his work in 1931 (Kahn, 1931). Due to their close 
connection and Keynes' respect for Kahn, Keynes used the basis that Kahn laid down in 
his work and implemented it in his famous book The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest, and Money (Keynes, 1936). In his work, Keynes argues that government 
spending, under certain conditions, can increase the GDP by more than the sheer amount 
that the government spends through the multiplication process of enhancing the national 
demand. To explain this argument, Keynes also presented the well know Keynesian 
consumption function and output function.  
1)𝐶 =  𝐶𝑎 +  𝑀𝑃𝐶 ∗ 𝑌
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2)𝑌 =  𝐶 +  𝐼 +  𝐺 +  𝑁𝑋
Equation 1) is the consumption function where C represents consumption, Ca is 
autonomous consumption (necessary consumption that is made even without any 
disposable income), MPC stands for marginal propensity to consume (cents spent on a 
dollar from additional disposable income), and Y is disposable income (total income 
minus net taxes). MPC is also directly connected to the marginal propensity to save 
(MPS) as what is not saved is spent; therefore, MPC= 1-MPS. 
Equation 2) is the output (=income) function where Y stands for output, C consumption, I 
is private investment, G government spending (not including transfers) and NX is net 
export. An essential assumption that Keynes made was that MPC was not constant over 
different levels of income in the economy. According to him, as the income grows, 
people will be more prone to save a big part of their economy and therefore, MPC 
decreases (MPS increases). Taking all this into consideration has significant impacts on 
the economy, as Keynes saw since if consumption spending decreases, the effective 
demand goes down and there is less income created in the economy which leads to 
stagnation. This is where Keynes argues that government spending should step in to 
stimulate the economy and increase the Y through higher government spending. 
Government spending will generate an income that is multiple of the initial size of 
government spending. So, a higher national income will result in higher investment and 
consumption spending and will bring the economy back on track.  
Concerning the multiplier, Keynes did not see the initial government spending as 
having only a one-time impact, and that is where the term Keynesian multiplier 
originated. Keynes understood the dynamic character of the economy and argued that 
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every spending will generate some income into the economy. As an example, he puts 
forward government spending. The initial act is the government spending a certain 
amount of money that will flow from the government to consumers. The consumers will 
then act on as their disposable income has increased, and they will increase their 
consumption and spend a part of it according to the size of their MPC. Such action will 
have multiple rounds and, in the end, creates a multiplying effect. He was not worried 
about a crowding out effect, which implies that government spending would not be 
effective as the increased spending is financed through additional borrowing and would 
increase interest rates. This in turn would lead to lower private investment and 
consumption as firms would find their projects less profitable and consumers would 
rather save their money due to the increased opportunity cost. He saw markets to be 
imperfect where people do not behave strictly rational and see future as uncertain. This 
leads to people being more prone to spending their additional income in the same period 
rather than smooth their consumption over future periods that are clouded with 
uncertainty (Skidelsky, 2009). There are issues with the validity of the crowding-out 
effect, especially, during the years after the Great Recession when the economy was 
below its potential, was facing low interest rates, and the influence of foreign savings, 
however, that will be talked about in a greater detail in the following chapters. 
Keynes’ understanding of this process was accepted during and in the decades 
after the Great Depression as he and his ideas were generally accepted as what helped to 
fight the depression. Even during his time, there were economists, mostly coming from 
the Austrian school of thought such as Hayek and Mises (Bas, 2011), who disagreed with 
this notion; however, first mainstream economists did not come until later who stood 
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strong opposition to his ideas. In the next section, those will be the economists and their 
ideas that I will talk about. 
2.2 Opposition to Keynes 
Between the 1940s and 1970s, following the Great Depression and the Second 
World War, Keynesian economists held the mainstream view on how the economy works 
and how it should be run. In this section, I will talk about three significant opponents to 
Keynes' concept of consumption function and government spending, Milton Friedman, 
Franco Modigliani, and Robert Hall. 
The first one to challenge Keynes' consumption function and theoretical 
framework after the Second World War was Milton Friedman. Friedman used to describe 
himself as a former Keynesian (Skousen, 1998), even though that was not found with 
great understanding among Keynes and his followers, but then he said his ideas had 
developed. He found the Keynesian consumption function as too simplistic and one 
layered and decided to put forward his framework that would explain how people react to 
disposable income and how their consumption changes that is now called the Permanent 
Income Hypothesis (PIH) (Friedman, 1957). One of the reasons he decided to do so was 
the emerging science of econometrics that allowed economists to follow the progress of 
different variables through time series. Although these methods were at its early stages, 
they showed that consumption is not as volatile as Keynes' consumption function would 
suggest, and therefore, there should be more to it than what Keynes offered as an 
explanation to the movements inside the economy. The PIH diminishes the ability of the 
government to fine-tune the economy based on expectations related to long-run 
considerations. Friedman introduces main features into the debate over consumption, and 
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that is adaptive rationality and perfect information. Friedman assumed that consumers are 
rational beings; therefore, they will maximize their utility over the entirety of their lives 
doing so by using the publicly available information about their future income, future 
prices, and future interest rates. In such a framework, Friedman claims that rather than 
spend their current income, people will focus on their permanent income (permanent 
income could be described as the present value of average income over the lifetime) and 
smooth the consumption over all periods in order to maximize their utility. Moreover, 
that is what leads Friedman and Keynes to different opinions on what motivates people to 
spend less or more in any given period. While Keynes claimed that current consumption 
is directly linked to current income, Friedman’s framework shows that it is not the 
current income that dictates current consumption, but it is the permanent income that will 
determine the size of current spending. He says that people will borrow or lend money 
based on whether their income is lower or higher than their permanent income and based 
on whether the interest rates are currently lower or higher than they will be in the future. 
It is important to point out a couple of circumstances that can alter this outcome.  
According to PIH, as described by Carlin and Soskice (2007), people are 
adaptive-rational. Adaptive rationality implies that consumers will act on and adapt to 
new information. For example, the news of a new, one-time income will lead the 
consumers to change their consumption path by including the additional income, while 
anticipated changes should have no impact on consumption. An unanticipated, one-time 
income will, however, increase the overall wealth of the consumer, and he will, therefore, 
increase the consumption over the lifetime by the amount of the additional income. 
Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2005) show on the example of tax rebates that on average, 
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the households spent 20-40% of the rebate once the received the check instead of when it 
was announced. They also showed that this was especially true for households with lower 
wealth and income and emphasizing the impact of credit constraints, the limited ability to 
borrow money. As an example, we can think of an unemployed person who does not 
have savings due to the previous low income and is incapable of accessing the credit 
market due to their low credit score. On the other hand, Japelli and Pistaferri (2010) show 
that it is true that people do indeed respond more to permanent increases in income over 
temporary ones. All in all, Carlin and Soskice find there to be three main reasons why a 
simple PIH framework does not align with empirical findings (Carlin & Soskice, 2007, p. 
25). The presence of credit constraints, impatience as consumers value presence over the 
future and the uncertainty about future income. In such a framework, we can see a 
resemblance of the Ricardian equivalence where people realize the cost of the budget 
deficit and spending as it will be taxed in the future and will not increase their 
consumption but rather opt for consumption-smoothing actions. This also affects business 
as they will smooth their investment over time and will not increase it due to increased 
government spending. Overall, it is clear to see that this framework implies that the 
multiplier will be low as government spending does not have a major influence on the 
actions of any of the agents. In general, the only thing that can alter their consumption is 
unexpected income (transitory income) that would affect their permanent income such as 
a natural disaster or war, but government spending does not fall under them, and 
Friedman also assumes an expected value of zero for transitory income. 
Another economist known to challenge Keynes was Franco Modigliani. His 
theory is called the Life Cycle Hypothesis (1963). Modigliani's ideas do not differ 
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significantly from Friedman's, but unlike Friedman, he refers to budget constraints. 
Modigliani assumes that consumers can predict their life expectancy and future income 
and therefore can smooth their consumption so that in no point in their life, they are 
worse or better off. Let us assume that Modigliani's representative agent is 20 and 
assumes to live 60 more years. In the first 20 years, this person assumes to be making less 
than their average life-long income and from 40 to 60 years old when they retire, they 
will be making more money than their average income. In such case, in the first 20 years, 
such agent will borrow money in order to not live under their average lifetime earnings 
and wealth until their income is higher than the average income at which point, they will 
spend less than they are making in order to pay back the loan and save for the retirement 
when their income falls again. In such a case, one-time government spending will not 
have a significant impact on their spending such consumers will either save this new 
income for future tax expenditure or spread this income over the future periods. In 
conclusion, similarly to Friedman, government spending will not have a high impact on 
such consumers since their MPC on this new income, as Keynes would put it, will be 
very small relative to Keynesian’s which leads to the multiplier being very low. 
The next economist I will discuss is Robert Hall. Before talking about Hall, it is 
important to look at Lucas and his critique (1976) that later Hall used in his work. Robert 
Lucas came up with a criticism of the econometric models that were used back then, 
when the old Keynesian approach was dominant especially after the Great Depression, 
describing them as stationary, backward looking, and with adaptive (or naïve) 
expectations. Lucas tried to change that by incorporating more dynamic and rational 
expectations into the model where consumers do not react to new events according as 
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they would be based on the past but based on the new information that they received, and 
they optimize their behavior accordingly. In the sense of econometrics, the idea was that 
using one parameter for new events, let’s say additional government spending, is not 
enough as the parameter is based on the past events that do not include the new 
information that the agents in the economy received. Hall follows up on this work and the 
work of Friedman (1957) and states that if Lucas (1976) is correct in his statement that 
current consumption is based on the permanent income using rational expectation and 
perfect information then any changes in relation to consumption should not be predictable 
and that is why his theory is called The Random Walk Hypothesis (Hall, 1978). Hall saw, 
using post-war data, that consumption does change even though consumers should be 
able to smooth it, according to Friedman’s and Lucas’ theory, and ask the question why 
that is so. He explains that the reason why that is so is that over their life, consumers 
receive new information about their future and are forced to change their expectations 
about their future income and therefore change their current consumption. Relating this 
government spending, any spending that is predictable (e.g., social security) will not have 
any impact on consumption. On the other hand, government spending that was not 
predicted and altered consumers' expectations would affect consumers' and their 
consumption. This goes hand in hand with the multiplier as unpredicted and temporary 
government spending will have the capacity to increase consumption and lead to a high 
multiplier. 
2.3 New Keynesian Economics 
The argument between traditional Keynesians and school of thoughts following 
Friedman, such as the New Classical School and Monetarists led to a synthesis between 
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the two different views and caused the origins of the New Keynesian synthesis. In this 
section, I will explain what this framework includes and what it implies about fiscal 
policy and the size of the multiplier. 
In general, Keynes was confident of the fact that the government spending 
multiplier would be higher than unity and that government spending has a positive effect 
on the economy through increased demand. On the other hand, the opposing argument 
was that government spending is an ineffective tool as people are rational and will not 
use the additional funds for immediate consumption, and therefore, the multiplier will be 
low. Nevertheless, there was a feeling that neither one of the explanations captures the 
entire picture, and hence, there was a push for a new framework that would be able to 
combine both. New Keynesian economics takes into consideration both theories to create 
a framework by incorporating micro theory to the macro theory that should be able to do 
that (Snowdon & Vane, 2005, p. 21). In the following sections, I will describe how the 
New Keynesian economics grasp the assumption of rationality, wage and price rigidity, 
expectations, and the state of the economy. 
Keynes did not use the assumption of rationality in his work as he did not find it 
to be the correct explanation of the behavior of individuals. This meant that he did not 
think people base their current consumption on predicted future income and that they act 
based on lifelong-utility maximizing bases. Such consumers are called hand-to-mouth 
consumers, meaning that the primary determinant of their current consumption is their 
current income. On the other hand, those economists assuming the existence of rational 
consumers argued that people are aware of the future cost of current government 
spending and that they will consider as more of a loan than a transfer and will not spend 
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the money right away but will keep for future expenditures. The empirical research 
showed that they are both partly correct; there are both types of consumers in the 
economy. And that is what the New Keynesian Theory predicts, as we can see, for 
example, in the work of Charles, Dallery, and Marie (2015). Such an assumption leads to 
different fiscal-policy implications. In an economy, where there are both types of 
consumers, it is not enough to spend more government money and assume positive 
impacts and a higher multiplier, but other considerations have to be accounted for. When 
dealing with hand-to-mouth consumers and "rational consumers", it is crucial to direct 
the spending effectively. Hand-to-mouth consumers will increase their current spending 
if they receive additional funds, while "rational consumers" will not. Therefore, for a 
higher multiplier, the spending should be aimed at the consumers who will act on it 
immediately, not save it for future tax expenditure or spread this additional income over 
future periods. 
Another difference between Keynes and (New) Classical is the existence of wage 
and price rigidity. Keynes did not see the markets as perfectly competitive markets with 
clearing prices, but he assumed the existence of rigidities. Using the traditional 
Keynesian cross or IS-LM approach, we can see that the Keynesian theoretical 
framework assumed fixed nominal wages and prices. This has the effect of a higher 
multiplier as the initial spending will not have the effect of higher inflation, and therefore, 
people will enjoy lower real prices and a higher real income. The New Keynesian 
economics accept this assumption to a certain degree; however, they attempt to come up 
with a microeconomics base for a slow adjustment of wages and prices (Snowdon & 
Vane, 2005). Traditional Keynesian models see the reason behind the output fluctuations 
 16 
as the inability of nominal wages to adjust. After the criticism of these assumptions, early 
new Keynesians tried to explain where this rigidity comes from. Fischer (1977) and 
Taylor (1980) introduced nominal rigidities in the shape of long-term wage contracts. In a 
modern economy, wages are generally set ahead of time for a certain period. To Fischer 
and Taylor, this showed the existence of nominal wage rigidities that would have the 
power to affect the economy and suppress the effects of monetary policy. However, their 
explanation did not possess a great microeconomics foundation; instead, they used the 
explanation of a "revealed preference" for long-term contracts as frequent changes carry 
disadvantages such as uncertainty. In his model, Fischer accepts the assumption of 
rationality which is also included in the wage negotiations as the negotiators have rational 
expectations about inflation and form nominal wage increases to equal expected inflation 
in order to maintain a constant real wage. However, as Fischer shows in his model when 
there is a negative, nominal demand shock, the aggregate demand will go down while the 
nominal wages remain fixed and that will lead to a decrease in output in the short run 
which is where monetary policy comes into effect. Fischer shows that as long as the 
monetary institutions can manage the aggregate demand by increasing the money supply 
quicker than the event of wage renegotiations, they can redirect the economy back to its 
initial point by increasing the money supply. In general, we can see that in Fischer's and 
Taylor's framework, the assumption of the neutrality of money (no effect on real values 
such as real wage or prices, only nominal values) does not stand in the short run, 
however, with the introduction of monetary policy in following stages, things return to 
the initial point, and the real values remain constant in the long run as even anticipated 
monetary policy action has real effects since it is based on the information that becomes 
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available after the contracts have been negotiated. Nevertheless, there were two main 
problems with the explanation of fluctuations through nominal wage rigidities. First, 
these explanations were missing a solid microeconomics underpinning. The second 
problem was the countercyclical character of real wages. In Fischer's model, the increase 
in employment through monetary expansion happens due to the decrease in real wages, 
which was disregarded by Mankiw (1990). In his later work, Mankiw (1991) used this 
finding to say that the sticky wages model did not work. He stated that if indeed 
contractions in aggregate demand were connected to higher real wages, then they would 
be ‘quite popular'. This conundrum led him to turn his focus to nominal rigidities in the 
goods and services market rather than the labor market. This shift of interest is where the 
New Keynesian started to differentiate themselves as they turned their attention to 
imperfect competition (Rotemberg, 1978). In imperfectly competitive markets, firms stop 
being price takers as the changes in price will affect their sales and profits based on the 
price demand elasticity, and they will attempt to find the optimal level. However, such a 
process can be hindered by the existence of, what Rotemberg (1978) called, the “PAYM 
insight” (Snowdon & Vane, 2005, pp. 372-376). The idea behind the PAYM insight is 
that the private cost to the firm of nominal price rigidities is much greater than the one to 
the entire economy. These nominal rigidities are also called "menu costs". Menu costs 
include a variety of costs connected to the change in prices such as the cost of new 
menus, catalogs or renegotiations with suppliers and customers. Blanchard and Kiyotaki 
(1987) show that the entire economy experiences a different impact from the nominal 
price rigidities from an individual firm as price rigidities affect the aggregate demand 
externality since the society would benefit from a universal decrease in prices; however, 
 18 
there is no private incentive to do so. Under perfect competition, a nominal demand 
shock would lead to firms lowering their prices all around the economy. Such move 
lowers the marginal cost for all the firms, and they would be satisfied to sell for a lower 
price which once again leads to a lower marginal cost, and the economy would go back to 
its initial state as the real balances increased and therefore, the aggregate demand 
increases. However, when including price rigidities using the menu costs, such nominal 
demand shock will cause fluctuations as the decrease in nominal demand will not be 
counteracted by the decrease in prices. Another issue that Mankiw and Romer (1991) 
analyze are real rigidities. They see such rigidities as a magnifier of the impact that 
nominal rigidities might have. As Snowdon and Vane (2005, pp. 378-380) present in their 
work, we can present this on an example. Let us assume that the money supply declines. 
Such move would normally lead to a decrease in prices by the firms, however, due to the 
existence on menu costs and nominal price rigidities, it does not happen, and therefore, 
this will then be followed by a decrease in real output. Since the aggregate declines, firms 
do not have use for as many workers as before, and hence, the demand for labor 
decreases. Assuming the supply of labor is relatively inelastic, the real wage will decline 
as the nominal wage decreases, which in transfer lowers the marginal cost. This would be 
counteracted due to an upward-sloping character of the marginal cost curve as firms 
would have a greater incentive to reduce their; nevertheless, that is not the case if the 
price demand elasticity falls after the decrease in demand. In such a case, firms' incentive 
to lower prices is indirectly correlated with the fall in demand elasticity.  
We also can find different sources of real rigidities in the New Keynesian 
framework such as judging quality by price, capital market imperfections or customer 
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markets where customers do not search for prices as frequently compared to the 
frequency of their purchases and therefore, firms will not risk changing their prices very 
often an increase in price will be immediately noticed, and customers will look elsewhere 
while a decrease in price will not gain as much traction. To summarize, the New 
Keynesian economics differentiate themselves from the traditional Keynesian economics, 
New Classical economics, Monetary economics, and others by the way they handle the 
issue of rigidities. Firstly, they took a step away from the explanation of fluctuation 
through wage rigidities and turned to price rigidities. Secondly, they created a 
microeconomic foundation for their arguments of price rigidities to show their real 
impact in the short run with a slow return to equilibrium. In the process of the return to 
the equilibrium, they also found a seat at the table for the effects of monetary policy. 
The assumption of expectations goes hand in hand with the assumption of 
rationality and therefore, the outcomes for the size of the multiplier from Keynes’ theory 
and (New) Classical relating to the assumption of expectations are similar to the ones 
coming out of the assumption of rationality. Keynes’ expectations are based on the notion 
of animal spirit while the New Classical economists work with rational expectations 
which will lead to a high Keynesian multiplier while the New Classical multiplier will be 
low.  When it comes to the New Keynesian economics, there is a general assumption of 
adaptive expectations, however, adaptive expectations are generally not as strong as the 
(New) Classical rational expectations. This can lead to different-sized multipliers, 
depending on the strength of the assumption, but commonly, the New Keynesian 
multiplier will be lower than for the Keynesian framework and higher than the Classical 
framework. 
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The research on the effects of the state of the economy on the multiplier has been 
a popular topic recently due to the events of 2008. Nevertheless, it is something that even 
Keynes and others dealt with. Keynes agreed that if the economy is at its potential, 
additional government spending can have the effect of crowding out private investment, 
but he also argued these leakages can be overcome by monetary policy actions also, due 
to the fact that the economy is generally not at or above its potential which leads to a 
higher marginal propensity to consume and therefore, commonly, government spending 
has a positive impact (Keynes, 1936, pp. 119-120, 124) (Spencer & Yohe, 1975). 
Friedman and others did not see it that way as they focused on the long-run impacts and 
claimed that government spending will always be dampened. The New Keynesian 
economics predicts a higher multiplier during downturns and lower multiplier during 
expansions by combining these two arguments (Auerbach & Gorodnichenko, 2012) 
(Thomakos, 2012) (De Cos & Moral-Benito, 2013). Along with dealing with downturns 
and expansions, there is always the question of zero lower bound. The New Keynesian 
economists accept the argument that monetary policy has the power to lower the size of 
the multiplier by making fiscal policy ineffective through higher interest rates. However, 
this does not apply for the periods of zero lower bound and fixed interest rates when the 
monetary policy cannot counteract the fiscal policy, and during such times, the multiplier 
should be higher. 
In conclusion, the New Keynesian economists argue that there is not only one 
multiplier, but there are different multipliers depending on circumstances. This can be 
seen in their framework, as well, as it reflects the actual research that I will talk about in 
the next section.
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
For many decades when the mainstream theory was dominated by the 
Neoclassical, New Classical, Real Business Cycle and Monetarist theories, fiscal policy 
was seen as a tool with little use when it came to affect the national economy. The 
consensus was that fiscal actions taken by the governing body would be offset by 
monetary phenomena. That all changed when the Great Recession hit the global economy 
in 2008, and interest rates dropped to zero. This development of events led the 
economists and policymakers to turn to a more traditional tool of controlling the 
economy: fiscal policy. Ever since the academic sphere has seen a rapid increase in the 
interest in fiscal policy and its effects on the economy and a big part of this debate is over 
government spending multipliers.  
For Keynes, this was proof that the government should intervene through 
increased spending when the economy is to face downfall. This debate has come a long 
way since, nevertheless, a clear consensus is yet to be found. Such consensus would bring 
a more unified approach to fiscal policy around the globe and a more effective tool how 
to handle government spending and therefore, it is essential to look at what the research 
has brought so far. This section will be divided into three categories, state-independent 
multipliers, cyclical multipliers, and zero lower bound.
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3.1 State-independent Multipliers 
In the early stages of the research into the fiscal multipliers, the models were 
generally not profound enough to differentiate between different states of the economy. 
One of the first economists to study this was a Harvard economist Robert J. Barro.
Barro's first work on government spending multipliers dealt with the impact of 
government spending on the output and real interest rate (Barro, 1981). Using defense 
spending as the shock variable, he concludes that it is true that temporary shocks to 
defense spending create a sizeable temporary response; however, he does not find any 
long-term positive benefits as there is a more of a dampening process than a multiplying 
one. In another work, Barro and Redlick (2011) once again employ defense spending as 
the shock variable, but this time, they use Ramey's narrative approach and land with 
different results. The narrative approach is a method to identify an endogenous change in 
a variable. In this case, Ramey created a series from news found in the newspapers about 
unanticipated changes in defense spending. After analyzing US annual data, including 
WWII, they find that contemporaneous defense spending leads to a multiplier of 0.4-0.5 
while permanent spending will yield multipliers higher by 0.1-0.2. Nevertheless, Barro 
and Redlick still find no evidence for the multiplier to be higher than unity. It is essential 
to say that Barro's results are influenced by his inclination to Ricardian equivalence. 
Barro, as a New Classical economist, includes the assumption of perfect rationality in his 
work that dampens the size of the multiplier through the channels of consumption 
smoothing and forward-looking behavior. The assumption of rationality is a complicated 
issue as, on one hand, it offers a simple explanation for the representative agent; 
however, it does not allow for incorporating the heterogeneity of society and its agents. 
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One of the most critical works on the topic of fiscal multipliers is by Blanchard 
and Perotti (2002). In their work, Blanchard and Perotti are one of the first ones to use the 
Structural Vector Auto Regressive (SVAR) method to analyze the impact of fiscal policy 
on the economy. SVAR, unlike traditional VAR, can include assumptions. Blanchard and 
Perotti take a dataset set in the US ranging from 1960 through 1997. They find them 
multiplier to be higher than unity. Despite the great importance of their work, Blanchard 
and Perotti use straightforward theoretical assumptions that can be disputed. They use 
Cholesky decomposition by incorporating government spending, output, and net taxes in 
that order. This ordering reflects their theoretical assumptions where government 
spending is not directly affected by output as it takes more than a quarter for the federal 
government to respond to a change in output. The output is affected by government 
spending immediately since it is an automatic increase in GDP, while net taxes are not 
affected by either right away. This a debatable issue as one could say that this model is 
too simplistic and does not reflect the nature of expectations or monetary policy. Another 
issue with their model, as pointed out by Ramey (2016), is the way they transform 
elasticities to multipliers. I will talk about this in greater detail in Chapter 5; however, 
such transformation as used by Blanchard and Perotti leads to an overestimation.  Gali et 
al. (2007) find similar results in his work when he looks at the US from 1948 to 2003. In 
the late 2000s, the fiscal policy research started applying a new model called the New 
Keynesian - Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (NK-DSGE). DSGE models have 
the advantage over VAR models that they are heavily based on theoretical assumptions 
which means that there can be no argument over the causation between two variables, 
unlike VAR models that generally only shows us the correlations between the followed 
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variables. Nevertheless, what can be described as an advantage can also be looked at as a 
flaw of these models as all the predictions from these models as being a reflection of the 
theoretical and political background of the person or institution that created the model 
(discussed in Chapter 4.1) . One of the pioneers of this approach was Forni in 2009 who 
applied the NK-DSGE model on the US quarterly data from 1980 to 2005. He found that 
the most significant impact lies with direct transfers to households. Another important 
work was done by Zubairy (2014). Zubairy looks at the US economy and estimates both 
government spending multipliers and tax multipliers. She finds that the government 
spending multiplier is the largest on impact at 1.07. Such results support the notion of 
government spending increasing private expenditure. 
We can see that using linear models. The multiplier is generally lower than unity; 
however, it depends heavily on the implemented assumptions and shock variable. 
3.2 Cyclical Multipliers 
As the proficiency of econometric methods progressed, researches started to be 
able to estimate multipliers over different states of the economy. This was a significant 
breakthrough to understand how fiscal policy affects the economy at different times. In 
this section, I will present some of the most critical works on this topic. 
In more recent years, some of the most impactful works came from Alan Auerbach and 
Yuriy Gorodnichenko. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko used RSVAR in their work 
(Auerbach & Gorodnichenko, 2012). The RSVAR model is a variation of SVAR that can 
follow changes between recession and expansion. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko used this 
quality to estimate the multiplier in the OECD countries between 1985 and 2010 and 
found that the multiplier is high during recessions, 2.3, and low during expansions, close 
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to zero. Their recession multipliers are influenced by their handling of the recession 
periods as pointed out in Ramey and Zubairy (2018). In their work, they put forward an 
assumption that from the start of a recession period, such a recession will go on for 20 
quarters. However, that is rarely the case that a recession would last precisely 20 periods; 
therefore, their estimates can be biased due to the imperfect handling of transitions 
between recessions and expansions. Similar results using RSVAR can be seen by 
Thomakos (2012), 1.32 in recession and near zero in expansion, or De Cos and Moral-
Benito (2013), 1.4 during recession and 0.6 during expansion. Another influential work 
comes from Ramey and Zubairy (2018). Ramey and Zubairy both focus on the size of the 
multiplier during different stages of the economy. In their work, they use Jorda's local 
projections to estimate the multiplier in the US during recessions, expansions, and zero 
lower bound. They find that the multiplier remains constant and lower than unity over all 
states of the economy. Their explanation why that is so is that government spending 
crowds out private investment through higher interest rates, and at the same time, import 
and export decrease. Ramey and Zubairy use narrative defense spending as their shock 
variable to avoid heterogeneity. This method is undoubtedly a viable method to estimate 
the effects of defense spending on the domestic economy, nevertheless, the main interest 
should be in the effects of regular government spending as it has a closer connection to 
the actual economy and the estimates of defense spending are generally lower than the 
estimates of public investment, for example. Ramey is also one of the few economists 
who, despite finding the zero lower bound multiplier to be lower than unity, admits after 
analyzing estimates from different economists, that there is solid evidence that the 
multiplier is indeed higher than unity, as can be seen in Ramey (2016). Bauer, Poplawski-
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Ribeiro, and Weber (Baum, Poplawski-Ribeiro, & Weber, 2012) use nonlinear threshold 
VAR (TVAR) to show how the multiplier different over different states of the economy. 
They use the dataset from G7 countries except for Italy and find that the multiplier is 
usually positive and smaller than unity, however, that does not always have to be the case 
if there is a significant output gap. Such findings go along with the Keynesian and New 
Keynesian framework. Due to using datasets from multiple countries, they can compare 
the estimates between different economies. They find that the US has a multiplier greater 
than unity, 1.7 after the first four quarters, during a period of the negative output gap, 
while Canada and the UK have a small multiplier, lower than unity. Their use output gap 
is a vital piece of the puzzle as the existence of an output gap points towards a higher 
multiplier which reflects in their work. 
Overall, economists generally agree that the multiplier is smaller but positive 
during expansions, but higher than unity during the recession. Next, I will look at the size 
of the multiplier during zero lower bound periods. 
3.3 Zero Lower Bound Multipliers 
DSGE models can accommodate different states of the economy, which 
economists used to analyze the size of the multiplier during Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) 
periods along with more traditional VAR models. One of such works was written by 
Gauti B. Eggertson (2011). Eggertson, in his work, estimates the size of the multiplier 
during zero lower bound periods. He models an economy with insufficient demand and 
zero interest rates, and an economy during regular periods. During normal periods 
(sufficient demand, interest rates higher than zero, and non-zero capital), he finds that the 
multiplier is around 0.5. However, once he constrains the economy with ZLB, 
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insufficient demand, and zero capital, he finds that the multiplier reaches the heights of 
2.3. Comparable work was done by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011). They 
also assume no capital during ZLB and get similar results to Eggertson. Their mutual 
explanation goes along with the New Keynesian theory stating that during non-ZLB 
periods, the existence of a negative output gap would be followed by a decrease in 
interest rates which would lead to eliminating the gap. ZLB makes such move 
impossible, and therefore, fiscal policy becomes more effective. These two models are 
influenced by the theoretical assumptions Eggertson made about ZLB, insufficient 
demand, and zero capital. The existence of insufficient demand and zero capital will 
boost the size of the multiplier as the new inflow of federal money into the economy will 
be used to get the economy back to its equilibrium.  
The research shows us that the multipliers are, in fact, higher than unity during 
zero lower bound periods, just as the theory predicts.  
3.4 Multiplier after the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) 
The Great Recession of 2008 was a great tragedy to the American and world 
economy, causing a massive drop in employment rate and national GDPs. Nevertheless, 
for economists interested in the fiscal and monetary policy, this event offered an excellent 
opportunity to analyze these forces. In this section, I will talk about the Great Recession, 
how it affected the economy, then I will focus on the fiscal response from the Obama 
administration, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, and what we have 
learned about the multipliers from during the following years. 
During the 2000s, the US economy was doing as good as ever with a steady 
growth rate, low unemployment rate, and general optimism about the future. This lasted 
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until December 2007 when the economy was hit by the crash of the housing market. 
During the following two years, the US economy lost more than 7.5 million jobs, and 
households around the US lost around $16 trillion of net worth due to the drop in the 
stock market. This represented a hard test for, at that point, incoming President Barack 
Obama. Unlike many European countries that decide to with austerity plans, the Obama 
administration decided to stimulate the US economy by increasing government spending 
in addition to some unconventional monetary policies (called quantitative easing). This 
resulted in the creation of the ARRA that came into effect in 2009 and had the goal of 
providing American households and businesses with more income. The plan was to spend 
an additional $787 billion, which was later increased to $831 billion, on health care, 
infrastructure, direct transfers, education, and tax provisions (Amadeo, 2018). All the 
data can be seen in Table 10. Along with the expansionary fiscal policy, the Federal 
Reserve (Fed) that was run by Ben Bernanke from 2006 to 2014 decided to respond to the 
downturn by lowering the overnight interest rate to the proximity of zero. When 
comparing the characteristics of the ARRA and theoretical frameworks talked about in 
Chapter 2, we can see that this policy was based on the Keynesian ideas, which naturally 
caused many controversies that are still going until now. Next, I will look at the literature 
that has looked at the effects of the fiscal policy following the Great Recession. 
In her work, Ramey (2019) analyzes how fiscal policy research has developed 
after the Great Recession, the changes in methodology and theoretical understanding. 
Ramey shows the crucial differences that came with modern research techniques and 
frameworks. In terms of theoretical aspects, Ramey shows how the New Keynesian 
economics and models include both sides, the Keynesian approach focusing on the 
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demand side and the Classical approach focusing on the supply-side channels. Along 
with theoretical aspects of the research, Ramey shows how the methodology has evolved. 
She describes that thanks to the development of econometric techniques,  the researches 
have been able to capture the dynamic and interconnect character of the multipliers and 
other variables through the improvement in the SVAR models and DSGE models. As an 
example, she shows the ability to include fiscal frictions or the new way to transform 
elasticities of government spending and GDP to actual multipliers. In terms of actual 
estimates, Ramey after studying related works finds that the average multiplier is 
between 0.6 and 1; however, it can be higher depending on the circumstances such as the 
exchange rate regime, type of government sending or the state of the economy. 
Next, let us look at individual examples of works estimating the multiplier after 
the Great Recession. From the Keynesian theoretical standpoint, the multipliers should 
have been relatively high during the periods after the Great Recession and the 
implementation of the ARRA. Blanchard and Leigh (2013) followed the development 
around European countries and found that the countries that decided to implement 
significant fiscal consolidations went through a slower growth than the IMF predicted. 
Such a result points to the underestimation of the multipliers and concludes that the 
multiplier must have been higher than one during these years. On the other hand, Alesina, 
Favero, and Giavazzi (Alesina, Favero, & Giavazzi, 2012) after analyzing the multipliers 
around different OECD countries found the multiplier to be low and constant regardless 
of the state of the economy. In terms of the impact of the ARRA, there were multiple 
studies on the size of the multiplier during the recovery, and following years, however, 
there is no substantial evidence that the multiplier was as high as the federal government 
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expected. First, I will show the estimations from the Congressional Budget Office and 
International Money Fund, and then we will look at the works from independent 
researchers. 
The CBO has released multiple reports on the estimates of the multipliers 
resulting from the ARRA spending and transfers. The latest one was published in 2015, 
covering the period from 2009 to 2014 (Congressional Budget Office, 2015). In their 
work, they use evidence from models and historical relationships to estimate the size of 
the multiplier for different types of spending. In their model, they include both direct and 
indirect effects of the initial shock by using estimates from macroeconometric forecasting 
models, direct estimation using historical data, and other relevant research. As the 
estimates of indirect effects and relationships that have an impact have a clear connection 
to the assumptions we make about these relationships, the CBO includes a range of 
results that reflect differing opinions on the magnitude of these relationships and how 
they affect the size of the multiplier. They find that government purchases of goods and 
services yield multipliers between 0.5 and 2.5, transfers to local and state governments 
for infrastructure lead to a multiplier between 0.4 and 2.2, transfers to local and state 
government for other purposes end with a similar multiplier, 0.4 and 1.8, transfer 
payments to individuals 0.4 and 2.1, and one-time payments to retirees are estimated to 
be between 0.2 and 1.0. After all, they conclude that despite short-term multipliers being 
reasonably high, their 2015 work shows that the long-run effects will cause a slight 
decrease in the output (0 – 0.2), but no adverse effects on employment. The issue with 
their modeling is the reliance on assumptions laid on the relationships between variables. 
The CBO uses historical evidence and theoretical research to assign parameters to these 
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relationships and then create a range based on different theoretical priors. It ends up with 
ranges being over 2 points, which does not necessarily give us much information about 
the actual size of the multiplier. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) is another institution that has been dealing 
with the issue of the multiplier after the Great Recession. In the work of Spilimbergo, 
Symansky, and Schindler (2009), they analyze different mechanics of estimating the 
multiplier and look into its characteristics. They recognize the importance of the country, 
time, and circumstance specifics. They use regression analysis and find that the low set of 
multipliers is 0.3 on revenue, 0.5 on capital spending, and 0.3 on other spending. The 
higher set of estimates is 0.6 on revenue, 1.8 on capital spending, and 1 for other 
spending. Nevertheless, they do acknowledge that these multipliers might be 
underestimated because of the lack of data that leads to attenuation bias. In a similar work 
published by IMF from Batini, Eyraud, Forni, and Weber (2014), they analyze the 
estimates from various papers and find the multiplier to average about 0.75 in advanced 
economies during regular times, while when analyzing the economy during downturns, 
the multiplier gets higher. They also create a model to estimate predicted multipliers for 
different countries based on their characteristics using proxies such as how open the 
economy is, the rigidity of the labor market, government debt, and others. Using this 
model, they find that the multiplier for the US during normal times should be between 1.0 
and 1.4. Their model can be beneficial for low-developed countries where the data is not 
available on such scale as in the developed countries. Their estimates for these countries 
can be used for improving the local fiscal policy; however, more testing is needed to be 
done to see whether these estimates stand worldwide and under any circumstances. 
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When looking at the work of independent researchers, the government spending 
multiplier rarely exceeds unity for aggregate national data as can be seen in Cogan 
(2010), Drautzburg and Uhligh (2015), however, that changes when the focus is turned to 
the cross-state data. Feyer and Sacerdote (2011) employ both types by analyzing the 
impact of the ARRA on job creation through cross-sectional regressions and time series 
regressions and then transforming these results into multipliers. They find the multipliers 
to be higher when looking at the aggregate data at 0.47 compared to 1.06. The highest 
multiplier can be found for transfers to low-income households (2.31 national, 1.96 cross-
state) while the lowest is for teachers and police spending (-0.71, -3.31). In their work, 
Feyer and Sacerdote estimate state-level estimates and then transform their results to the 
national level. This is also called an "aggregation problem". Unfortunately, it is not as 
simple to take state estimates and transform them as the entire economy faces different 
circumstances such as federal debt, exchange currency, net export, federal output gap, 
and others. Therefore, their cross-state estimates can be seen as valid, but one has to their 
national estimates with a pinch of salt. Another work was done by Oh and Reis (2011) 
that focused on the effects of government spending and tax transfer as the response to the 
Great Recession. They created a model that included both the neoclassical assumption of 
wealth effects and Keynesian assumption of the impact of lower-income households and 
their increased demand. The wealth effect refers to transfers of money from high-income 
households to low-income households. As the marginal worker pays more in taxes than 
receives in transfers, a higher transfer will decrease the wealth of the marginal worker, 
which will force them to increase their labor supply. Their estimated multiplier is very 
low for government spending, 0.06. We could discuss the treatment of the assumptions 
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implemented. The implementation of New Classical assumptions could lead to erasing 
the effects of the Keynesian channels and therefore, lead to a multiplier low such as this 
one. Chodorow-Reich (2019) put together a survey of the works dealing with the cross-
state effects of the ARRA and found the mean to be 1.8. He then goes on to argue that the 
cross-state multipliers are merely lower bounds for the national multipliers when the 
economy is facing a liquidity trap. A liquidity trap is a situation when the economy is 
facing low interest rates and high savings rates, which make the monetary policy 
ineffective. In such a case, people will rather hold on to their savings instead of investing 
in low-return bonds. Therefore, the ARRA multipliers, he argues, were probably even 
higher than 1.8. In her work, Ramey (2019) argues against this conclusion as she finds 
Chodorow-Reich answering the wrong question. Ramey says that since Chodorow-Reich 
is assuming per capita values for government spending and employment and therefore, 
she concludes that his findings only represent the additional employment in the average 
state following the ARRA, but they do not answer much aggregate employment was 
created through it due to the possible heterogeneity in the treatment effects. Therefore, 
assuming national multipliers through cross-state multipliers can be misleading and 
overestimated. Then she goes on a uses Chodorow-Reich’s replication data but weights 
by initial population data and uses overall government spending, not only transfers and 
purchases directed to local and state entities, and finds that even using his model, and 
finds the multiplier to be lower than unity at 0.9. 
Overall, the evidence points to the fact that the government spending multipliers 
were not higher than unity during the years following the Great Recession despite the 
theoretical framework pointing to such a conclusion. One explanation can be due to the 
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mishandling of ZLB periods. The mainstream assumption is when the economy is facing 
zero interest rates during these times, that should mean that fiscal policy would be more 
effective due to the constraints on monetary policy. However, Swanson and Williams 
(2014) argue that this does not apply when looking at 1-year and 2-year treasury bonds as 
the yields on them were relatively unconstrained from 2008 to 2010, and therefore, 
monetary policy would have the capacity to counteract the effects of any fiscal stimulus 
the movements of interest rates.  
Along with their criticism, we can also turn to Palley (2016) to see that the ZLB 
periods do not necessarily have to reflect on the economy as they are supposed to 
according to the mainstream theory. I will talk about this issue more in Section 4.2.
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Chapter 4: Impact of Methodology and Theoretical Assumptions 
The differences between the theoretical frameworks are apparent. The Keynesian 
and New Keynesian approach assumes that the multiplier will be positive and more 
significant than unity. On the other hand, the New Classical economists would say that 
the multiplier will be positive; however, it will not be greater than unity. These outcomes 
result from differing assumptions included in their models that result in these 
conclusions. However, that does not explain why there is often time a disagreement 
between two economists from the same school or how such assumptions directly affect 
empirical research. In Section 4.1, we will go over how the methodology can affect the 
estimations of the multiplier through the choice of model, shock variable, etc. In Section 
4.2, I will create a connection between the theoretical framework, its assumptions, and 
how it directly affects empirical research and its results. 
4.1 Choice of Methodology 
Macroeconomists and econometricians have, for a long time, been struggling to 
identify the right model to use to when analyzing the effects of fiscal policy. Currently, 
we can find three main models that are used to do so. Macro-econometric forecasting 
models, time series models, and DSGE models. All of them have their pros and cons, as 
well as they are better suited for different situations, datasets, and variables. In this 
section, we will compare time series models and DSGE models, and how they affect the
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estimates of government spending multipliers. Next, we will look at the choice of the 
shock variable.
Time Series Models 
When talking about time series models in relation to fiscal policy and government 
spending multipliers, what is usually meant is the vector autoregression model (VAR). 
VAR models serve to capture correlations between variables over time. In their general 
form, they do not require any theoretical background, which makes them relatively 
simple to work with and not affected by false assumptions. Their weakness is that 
without such theoretical assumptions, it can be hard to assess the direction of causation 
between the variables of interest (identification problem) as well as their sheer reliance 
on the past which can be misleading if circumstances have changed. To tackle this issue, 
a large group of economists uses Structural VAR (SVAR) that allows making 
assumptions about the interaction between variables.  
DSGE Models 
A DSGE model is one of the latest inventions in the fiscal policy analysis and has 
been heavily used to capture its effects. DSGE models are based on the assumptions 
about people's decisions of how much to consume, save, work in relation to prices, taxes, 
wages, etc. Their advantage is that there can be no confusion about the relationships 
between variables as the theoretical backing offers a clear explanation. The underlying 
assumptions can differ, but traditionally, modern models include the assumption of the 
economy, including both rational and hand-to-mouth consumers, and limited expectations 
and information. This translates to the issue of consumption optimization as consumers 
are not capable of optimizing their consumption over their lifetime due to the limits on 
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the previously mentioned assumptions. Hence, if the theory stands, there is no problem, 
however, once the theory is flawed, so are the estimates. Compared to VAR and SVAR 
models, DSGE models are especially useful under a new set of circumstances where 
VAR and SVAR models would not yield accurate estimates due to their reliance on the 
historical data. DSGE models also offer the advantage of a great differentiation between 
the New Keynesian and New Classical theory. Generally, DSGE models offer higher 
multiplier, however, as Reichling and Whalen (2012) show in their work, the estimates 
for time series models range from 0.3 to 3.5 and from 0.5 to 2.25 for DSGE models. That 
being said, it would be false to assume that the differences between estimates would be 
due to different models. 
Despite the popularity of DSGE models, there has been a criticism of their use. 
Paul Romer (2016) focused on the issue of the use of econometrics in macroeconomics 
and took a better look at the use of DSGE models. He goes back to Lucas (1976) who 
influenced the modeling in economics with his critique and Romer says he agrees with 
him that there is a theoretical divergence in economics that translates into the research 
and affects it. For Lucas, it was the inclusion of parameters based on historical data that 
does not include the new information that would change the model. Romer sees a similar 
problem in the use of more modern DSGE models where economists predetermine the 
relationships between variables and the strength of these relationships according to their 
premise. He sees this as economists abandoning the scientific part of economics and stick 
to their theoretical assumptions. However, he disagrees with what the models brought 
after Lucas' critique. He points to the Great Recession that was not predicted by DSGE 
models and said that the real failure of economics was that the mainstream models were 
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blindfolded and could not predict such a serious event. The issue of the DSGE model 
being reliant on assumptions can be seen in the work by Carlin and Soskice (Carlin & 
Soskice, 2007, pp. 606-609). The evolution of the NK-DSGE model has been a complex 
one as through the addition of assumptions of rational expectations and technology 
shocks to the Neoclassical growth model, the Real Business Cycle model was introduced 
and after that by including money, imperfect competition in goods market and sticky 
prices it turned into the NK-DSGE model. The traditional NK-DSGE model works a 
flexible price equilibrium, however, unlike the Real Business Cycle due to the 
introduction of imperfect conditions in the goods market, this is not the first best 
equilibrium that can be only achieved by removing the imperfections. Also, real rigidity 
in the goods market implies the fact that the economy is not at its first best equilibrium, 
however, there is no involuntary unemployment. The implementation of sticky prices has 
the effect that (inefficient) shocks will produce equilibrium cycles around the (inefficient) 
flexible price equilibrium which will lead to an underemployment and a room for 
stabilization policy.  Therefore, one can see that by using the NK-DSGE model, the 
empirical research itself is suddenly constrained by a number of assumptions that will 
have an effect on the size of the multiplier (as discussed in Chapter 4.2) 
In summary, DSGE models brought a more dynamic character to the modeling in 
economics; however, one has to be cautious with their use as their estimates will be 
heavily influenced by the predisposed assumptions and biases from the researchers. 
Shock Variable 
The shock variable carries great importance to it as it lets us identify the 
government spending shock we are trying to follow. As Ramey (2016) describes in her 
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work, there are three main types of shocks: the one used in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) 
where they order government spending first through Cholesky decomposition; a narrative 
military news shock as can be seen in (Ramey & Zubairy, 2018) where they find 
unexpected military spending by following news articles; and lastly, Ben Zeev and 
Pappa’s (2017) defense news shock using medium-run horizon method. Ramey replicates 
the same methodology with the exception for shock variable to test how each one of 
those three will perform. After eight periods (quarters), Ramey finds that Blanchard and 
Perotti's shock variable yields the lowest multiplier (0.39, Ramey's yields (0.8), and Zeev 
and Pappa's is the greatest at 1.41. This clearly shows us that the choice of shock variable 
can have a major impact on the estimates.  
When discussing these three types of shock variables, the main concern was the 
identification of the shock. However, that is not the only issue that economists face. 
Another problem is that every single type of government spending has a different impact 
on the economy. A part of the government spending multiplier research has focused on 
the difference between government consumption multiplier and government investment 
multiplier. Ilzetzki (2013) found that government investment multiplier is greater than 
unity, while the government consumption multiplier is smaller.   
4.2 Choice of Theoretical Assumptions 
As described in Chapter 2 and its subsections, the New Keynesian and New 
Classical frameworks differ on many levels, which reflects in the models. In this 
subsection, we will look at what the assumptions are that are generally included in the 
models, and how they affect the size of the multiplier.   
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Type of consumers 
Two types of consumers can be assumed, Ricardian (rational) or Rule-of-thumb 
(Hand-to-mouth) consumers. Ricardian consumers follow their permanent income rather 
than their current income, and every increase in government spending will lead to them 
saving more money as they expect to pay more in taxes in the future. Rule-of-thumb 
consumers follow their current income, and if that goes up due to increased government 
spending, they will increase their consumption. This differentiation plays a considerable 
role when it comes to estimating the size of the multiplier. If our model includes the 
assumption of all consumers being Ricardian consumers, the multiplier will be close to 
zero or zero as the additional will not be spent but saved. However, if everyone in our 
model is a hand-to-mouth consumer, we will get a multiplier greater than unity. In recent 
days, econometric models can accommodate both to be a better representation of the 
economy, as shown in Charles, Dalley, and Marie (2015).  
State of the Economy 
Another critical assumption is about the state of the economy and the reaction of 
all agents. Firstly, there are different ways to identify the state of the economy and use it 
for the following analysis, as shown in (Ramey & Zubairy, 2018), which can lead to 
different estimates. However, if we look away from this issue, then there is a need to 
make assumptions about the behavior of people during downturns and expansions. 
Downturns can affect consumers' confidence, marginal propensity to consume, and they 
can also affect financial markets and their willingness to lend money. All these things 
have to be taken into effect and included in the model’s assumptions as they will affect 
the size of the multiplier.  
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Expectations 
Expectations are connected with the assumptions of rationality as it is assumed 
that consumers are forward-looking and predict what is going to happen based on 
publicly available information. The assumption of expectations generally lowers the size 
of the multipliers as people can get better prepared and smoothen their consumption. For 
example, if consumers expect a decrease in government spending, they will lower their 
consumption now by a small amount so that the shock is not that major in the future and 
vice versa.  
Monetary Policy 
As has been shown in recent years, the conduct of monetary policy is of the 
utmost importance. There are commonly two main assumptions that can be made. Either 
the monetary policy follows the Taylor rule, or it is constrained (e.g., ZBL). Taylor rule is 
an approximation of the movements of nominal interest rate to changes in inflation, 
output, and other variables (Taylor J. , 1993). In the case of monetary policy following 
the Taylor rule, any action taking from the side of fiscal policy will be counteracted by 
monetary policy. For example, if government spending goes up, so will the interest rates 
which will lower consumption and investment. On the other hand, sometimes the central 
bank decides to keep interest rates constant, for example, during the Great Recession. In 
such a case, since the interest rate cannot move, the government spending will not alter 
with them and can have a full impact on the economy, which will lead to a higher 
multiplier. Such results when the interest rate is assumed to be fixed can be seen in 
Woodford (2011).  
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However, there has been a debate about whether our understanding of Zero Lower 
Bound or even negative interest rates is, indeed, correct. In his work, Palley (2016) 
disputes this notion. Krugman (1998) was the first one to introduce the concept of Zero 
Lower Bound to the New Keynesian economics as he analyzed the stagnation of the 
Japanese economy in 1991. His model is based on a traditional macro model that assumes 
consumers and firms rationally arriving at the equilibrium level of wages, prices, and 
interest rates. However, when the market is in excess supply, and the interest rate is 
constrained due to the zero lower bound, the level of output will have to adjust to the 
aggregate demand, not the other way around as flexible interest rates would allow. This 
leads to a leftward movement along the aggregate demand curve, lowering the quantity of 
goods demanded, and therefore, the output decreases. In the loanable funds market, both 
the supply and demand for goods will shift to the left due to the reduction in output that 
causes a decrease in private savings and investment. In a typical case, the central bank 
would direct its nominal interest rate to be equal to the targeted inflation rate plus the full 
employment (natural) interest rate; however, that does not work when the natural interest 
rate is negative, and the nominal rate is constrained by ZLB. This framework has been 
used many times to explain the occurrence of stagnation, but Palley (2016) disagrees on 
an empirical and theoretical basis. Regarding the empirical portion of his critique, he 
shows that since 2011 even during ZLB periods after the Great Recessions, the non-
financial business debt in the US has been increasing fairly fast, as well as the household 
debt since 2012. Nevertheless, that does not correspond with the story told by Eggertson 
and Krugman (2012) who in their work claimed that the natural interest rate was pushed 
down by consumers and firms paying back their debt and deleveraging which then led to 
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an excess in supply of loanable funds as the nominal interest rate was constrained by 
ZLB and could not reach the level of natural interest rate. He also criticizes the notion put 
forward by Krugman (2005) where he claims the global economy is in a saving glut, 
especially due to excess of savings in China. The supply of Chinese savings would, in 
such case increase the export of Chinese goods to the US, which brings along the increase 
in the supply of loanable funds and lowers aggregate demand in the goods market. In 
such a case, depending on the size of the glut, this might lead to a negative full 
employment interest rate that might not be achieved due to ZLB. However, Palley points 
out a couple of inconsistencies. Firstly, most of the Chinese export is produced by firms 
owned by foreign entities or joint-ventures. Therefore, the export schedule has more to do 
with global arrangements rather than their saving patterns. Secondly, he takes an issue 
with the notion that the increased export of Chinese goods will increase the supply of 
loanable funds in the US. He shows that these goods are financed by American banks 
who lend money to American consumers. He then criticizes the "neoliberal" policies that 
led to the financial crisis and ZLB periods by showing how the high and lows of the 
interest rate kept decreasing during business cycles from 1981 to 2010. As he notices, 
with every business cycle, the low of the interest rate kept getting closer to zero, and he 
states that the periods of zero lower bound that occurred after the financial crisis in 2008 
were nothing but a product of these policies that was long in the making. From the 
theoretical standpoint, he disagrees with Krugman (1998) who labeled ZLB as a liquidity 
trap. He takes an issue with the fact that liquidity trap only occurs when money and 
bonds are perfect substitutes which, as he states, is not correct since quantitative easing 
had the power, in the past, to alter the bond prices which would not have happened if 
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people were indifferent between money and bonds while the central bank would be 
exchanging money for bonds. Another point he takes an issue with is the idea that if the 
central banks did indeed decide to turn to negative nominal interest rates, then the private 
investment would go up and spur the aggregate demand. He says that might not be the 
case as the firms might decide to hold onto the money and their non-produced assets. 
During low-interest periods, the firms will turn from equity financing to loan financing as 
it is cheaper and will return the equity to the shareholders. They will also reduce their 
money holding as the return is low and will increase investment and holdings of non-
produced goods. In times of a negative nominal interest rate, firms might even turn to 
complete loan financing through share buybacks to repay their shareholders. The issue 
comes when the marginal efficiency of investment becomes zero as the firms will rather 
turn non-produced assets such as cash, investment commodities, patents, and others, and 
will greatly decrease their investment activities. Therefore, firms will rather spend money 
on existing assets rather than investing in the production of new ones. Palley also 
disagrees that lowering the nominal interest rate has to lead to an increase in private 
consumption. He points out that even though the opportunity cost is lower as the interest 
rate decreases, people also receive a smaller income through the interest payments and 
when looking at negative interest rates, people experience a drop in their wealth which 
leads to lower savings and lower consumption. This, in turn, decreases the aggregate 
demand and output. 
Another issue with monetary policy is its dependence on the state of the economy. 
Even though monetary policy is often used as an exogenous regressor, there is a clear link 
between the rate of growth and the actions of the monetary institutions. As an example, 
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we can imagine a growing economy where the main concern is to avoid overheating of 
the economy. In such a case, the central bank will be increasing interest rates to avoid 
overspending and, using Austrian terminology, malinvestment. This will last until the 
economy experiences a downturn in which case, the interest rates will be lowered to 
support private consumption and investment. Hence, monetary policy is procyclical. 
Nevertheless, to analyze the government spending multipliers, this does not represent a 
fatal problem. 
Overall, the mainstream economics tells us that the lower the interest rates, the 
higher the private investment and consumption; however, as Palley shows, that does not 
necessarily have to be the case. 
Nominal and Real Rigidities 
A big part of the Keynesian and New Keynesian framework is the assumption of 
price and wage rigidities. The New Classical theory and models tell us that additional 
government spending will lead to inflationary forces, which will increase nominal prices 
and nominal wages, therefore no change in real variables. On the other hand, the New 
Keynesian models include the assumption of the change in nominal prices and wages not 
to occur right away. In practice, that means that additional government spending 
increases the nominal income of consumers while nominal prices do not have the time to 
adjust right away, which leads to a higher real income. This will, in conclusion, lead to 
higher consumption and a higher multiplier in the short run.  
As we could see in Section 2.3, there are differences in the understanding of 
nominal and real rigidities between the (New) Classical, traditional Keynesian, and the 
New Keynesian theory. Based on the assumptions that are included where the New 
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Classical theory assumes immediate adjustment to changes and shocks in the economy 
and therefore, there is no place for rigidities, the Keynesian and New Keynesian theory 
does work with rigidities, however, from a different standpoint. The Keynesian theory 
works with fixed nominal rigidities in their framework, focusing mainly on the rigidities 
in the labor market. The New Keynesian theory, following the work of Mankiw (1991), 
turned to the nominal rigidities in the goods market where they assume rigidities in the 
short run that are counteracted, mainly by the monetary policy, in the long run. The 
conclusion for the size of the multiplier varies based on which theory we decide to use. In 
the New Classical framework, the size of the multiplier would be smaller as the non-
existence of rigidities would not allow the economy to be outside its equilibrium and 
therefore, there would be no changes in real income and wealth that would lead to higher 
private consumption or investment. On the side of the New Keynesian rigidities, there is 
more room for a higher multiplier; however, due to the inclusion of rationality in their 
framework, the multiplier would diminish over a longer period. The traditional 
Keynesian economics framework assumes fixed rigidities, and as Keynes (1936) 
predicted in his work, nominal rigidities can be an option for the economy how to 
increase its consumption, investment, and output in general. Therefore, for the Keynesian 
theory, the inclusion of rigidities means a chance for the multiplier to be high.  
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Chapter 5: Methodology 
5.1 SVAR  
 To analyze the size of the government spending multiplier during the period after 
the Great Recession, I employ an SVAR model based on the methodology used by 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), and later on, I make certain adjustments to this model and a 
different transformation to get the multiplier. I also estimate the multiplier for the entire 
economy and then for the economy without the FIRE industries. First, I will explain why 
I chose to follow Foley’s work (2011), and then I will describe how the SVAR model 
works in theory, and lastly, I will present the variables I included and how they affect the 
model.  
The SVAR model is a simple approach into estimating the impact of shocks as 
they analyze the historical relationships between variables without the need for an 
abundance of theoretical assumptions. Nevertheless, they do have a couple of issues. 
SVAR models might reflect the impact of omitted variables which can bias our estimates. 
Secondly, they are susceptible to identification restrictions, as shown in Uhlig (2005). 
The choice of identification has been criticized as economists choosing the identification 
to find appropriate results that go along with the theoretical priors. 
 In his work, Foley (2011) argues based on the classical framework that there are 
unproductive industries such as FIRE that inflate the calculations of GDP. As mentioned 
in Chapter 1, the FIRE sector's value added is not based on universal measures as are the
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remaining industries, but their value added is imputed to equal their income (wages and 
profits) and the difference between interest received and interest paid. However, there is a
direct relation between these variables and sales; therefore, the connection between 
aggregate demand and the imputed value added is likely to be small. He finds the 
measurement that does not include these industries to capture the state of the economy 
more accurately and shows how the entire economy went through a less severe recession 
compared to the economy without FIRE industries. Following his findings, I create a 
variable that captures the value added without FIRE industries and shows the real impact 
of the fiscal policy and a more accurate estimation of the size of the multiplier. 
 My first specification of the SVAR model is  
(4)𝑌𝑡 =  𝐴(𝐿, 𝑞)𝑌𝑡 − 1 + 𝑈𝑡 
 
Y is a three-dimensional vector of Tt. Gt, and X where T represents net taxes, G stands for 
government spending and X is the output. All three variables are transformed into real, 
per capita values, and logarithmic. As we will be discussed in greater detail in the next 
section, all three variables are quarterly series to capture and identify the government 
spending shock. Ut represents a vector of the reduced-form residuals of the 
aforementioned variables. A(L,q) is a four-quarter distributed lag polynomial in order for 
the lagged coefficients to depend on the selected quarter that is aligned with the 
dependent variable. My second specification of the SVAR model brings a slight twist on 
the work done by Blanchard and Perotti by including a log of the difference between the 
10-year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate and the 3-year Treasury Constant Maturity 
Rate. I will call this variable “interest rate”. The reasons will be explained in the next 
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section. However, that changes the specification by turning the vector Yt into four-
dimensional vector, including the interest rate, and same goes for the vector Ut. 
One of the greatest issues in how to estimate the spending multiplier is the identification 
of the government spending shock. I follow Blanchard and Perotti by assuming that any 
government spending not predicted by the lags of other variables represents an exogenous 
shock. 
(5) tt = a1xt + a2etg + ett 
(6) gt = b1xt + b2ett + etg 
(7) xt = c1xt + c2gt + etx 
ett, etg, etx represent uncorrelated shock that I am trying to recover. Equation (4) shows 
that all unexpected movements in net taxes are due to the unexpected change in output, 
a1xt, unexpected shock to government spending, a2etg, and structural shock to taxes, ett. 
The same structure applies to the following equations where government spending 
responds to unexpected changes in output, taxes, and government spending shocks, and 
changes in output depend on unexpected changes in government spending, taxes, and 
other shocks, etx. I assume that government spending is not automatically affected by 
changes in output within the first quarter and therefore, b1 = 0.  To determine the 
coefficient a1, I use the elasticities of government spending and taxes to output and 
employ the following equation. 
(8) a1 = 𝑎1 =  ∑ 𝜂𝑇𝑖,𝐵𝑖𝑖 𝜂𝐵𝑖,𝑋
𝑇𝑖
𝑇
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𝜂𝑇𝑖,𝐵𝑖 represents the elasticity of taxes of type i to the tax base and 𝜂𝐵𝑖,𝑋 is the elasticity of 
tax base to the output. I estimate the remaining coefficients in a similar fashion by 
running a regression of xt on gt and tt.  
After recovering these parameters through regressions, I move on to estimate the 
impulse response of the output to a government spending shock by employing both types 
of the specification and later by implementing the value added without FIRE industries to 
analyze the real impact of government spending. I run an SVAR with one-quarter lag 
with Cholesky ordering as I assume that the federal government is not able to notice a 
change in output, pass new legislation and implement it in order to alter government 
spending with one quarter. Cholesky ordering sets theoretical restrictions on the model as 
the way I order the variables will create relationships between them. My first 
specification is government spending, output, net taxes in that order. Such specification 
means that output is not affected by output or net taxes with the first quarter, the total 
output is only affected by government spending, and net taxes are not affected by either. 
In the second specification, I keep the first three variables and order interest rate last. In 
the third specification, I order government spending first, value added without FIRE 
second, and net taxes last. Now that I have parameters for all my variables, I can estimate 
the impulse responses by employing an impulse response function. The estimates from 
the impulse response function are, however, only elasticities to government spending 
shock; therefore, I have to transform those values to get the multiplier. I do so by dividing 
the log change in GDP with the log change in government spending and the average ratio 
of government spending to output. Ramey (2019) criticizes the way Blanchard and 
Perotti transform their estimated elasticities as they lead to larger, more cyclical 
 51 
multipliers, therefore, to show the difference, I also employ their way of transforming 
elasticities. Blanchard and Perotti's transformation captures static multipliers as they only 
employ the initial elasticities of government spending. I employ the largest elasticity of 
government spending to the government spending shock to capture a long-run multiplier 
that captures its size with better accuracy. Ramey also points out the problem in using the 
ratio of government spending and output as it substantially differs over time; however, 
this issue is not relevant to my work as I work with a small sample where the mean is 
0.18, the low 0.17, the high 0.19 and the median 0.18. 
5.2 Data Description 
In this work, I use quarterly data spanning from Q1 in 2009 to Q4 in 2018. The 
fact that I follow such a recent period allows me to use data directly from government 
sources that do not need to be extrapolated, such as they would for certain historical 
periods. The series consists of nominal gross domestic product, real gross domestic 
product, nominal government spending, real government spending, federal government 
receipts, 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Minus 2-Year Treasury Constant Maturity, 
and population. The real values for GDP and government spending are derived by 
applying GDP deflator using the 2012 chained American dollar value.  
To obtain nominal and real government spending and GDP, I use the data from 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis NIPA tables. NIPA tables offer both nominal GDP and 
real GDP along with the GDP deflator. When it comes to government spending, I include 
all federal, state, and local purchases and then subtract transfer payments. After that, I 
apply the GDP deflator to end up with real values for government spending. 
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To get the 10-year Treasury Constant: Maturity Rate, I use St. Louis FED database. I 
employ the monthly data following the 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Minus 2-
Year Treasury Constant Maturity and then derive their quarterly average. For the 
population variable, I use quarterly data estimates from the same database.  
5.3 Data Analysis and Context 
The period between 2009 and 2018 was profoundly affected by the events of 
2008. In 2008, the American and global economy was struck by a financial crisis that led 
to what is now called the Great Recession. Following the breakdown of the mortgage and 
eventually the entire financial system, the virus spread into every single part of the 
economy and paralyzed it for some time. Next, I will present data that will help us 
understand the early periods of the followed time frame, how the economy got on the 
road of recovery and ended with one of the most prolonged periods of growth in 
American history. I will also talk about how these events affect the size of the multiplier. 
Let’s start by following the GDP. 
As said before, the years following the Great Recession had many issues to them, 
however, the recovery lead to a growth that started with Q2 in 2009 and has not stopped 
since for a single quarter. That is if we are looking at the nominal GDP values. However, 
as any Basic Economics textbook says, the vital information lies with the real values. To 
get the full picture, I will also employ the population series to get the real GDP per 
capita. Figures 1 presents the real GDP per capita development over the 40 quarters that I 
follow. We can see that the economy went through a rather steady growth that, 
nevertheless, had minor setbacks over time.   
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To take a better look at individual quarters and their growth, I derive a series 
following the percentage growth rate of the real GDP per capita. Figure 2 shows us how 
the quarterly growth looked like over the years. We can see that out of the forty quarters, 
only eight of them experienced a drop in real GDP per capita, and seven of the eight were 
in the first five years after the Great Recession, after 2014, the economy experienced only 
one such drop. What does that mean for the size of the multiplier? Generally, expansions 
are supposed to result in smaller multipliers; however, one could argue that due to 
damaging effects of the financial crisis, the American economy was, at least in the first 
couple years, below its potential. If that is the case, the output gap, according to the 
Keynesian theory, leads to high multipliers as the factors in the economy are not fully 
utilized, and therefore, additional government spending would not generate the 
“crowding out” effect. And that is, indeed, the case. As we can see in Table 11, the US 
economy had not reached its potential until 2018 Q2. This could be suggestive of a higher 
multiplier than the pure assumption of expansion would predict. 
Now, let us move on to the issue of government spending. As said before, the 
government spending series is derived by including all federal, state, and local 
expenditure and subtracting transfer payments. During the darkest days of the financial 
crisis, the Obama administration passed a bill called the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009. This act was supposed to increase government spending 
between 2009 and 2019 by $787 billion, which was subsequently adjusted to $831 
billion. Even though a substantial part of this fiscal stimulus package revolved around tax 
incentives and transfers, a considerable chunk of the money went to infrastructure 
investment, housing, research, and similar expenses, as can be seen in Table 10. This 
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increase can be seen, especially when looking at the early quarters after the crisis when 
real government spending per capita increased by more than 5% in 2009 only (Figure 3). 
After the initial increase in government spending, the levels of it begun to decrease again 
to its previous heights. Nevertheless, such movements in government spending give us an 
option to analyze it better. As mentioned in Section 4.1, different types of government 
spending have different effects on the multiplier and significant part of the fiscal stimulus 
over the years was government investment which theoretically should lead to a higher 
multiplier as it not only supplies additional money into the economy, but it also directly 
creates new values and increases productivity. 
The unemployment rate is something that goes hand in hand with the state of the 
economy and generally has a negative correlation with the growth of GDP. This can be 
seen in Figure 4 as the US faced unemployment of over 9% at its peak in 2009 Q4 and 
over time, this rate dropped to less than 4%. Concerning the size of the multiplier, the 
idea is similar to the one when I talked about the output gap. Higher unemployment 
means underutilized capacities, and hence, the additional money supply in the economy 
would lead to an increased private spending and consumption and the multiplier should 
be higher during the periods of the high unemployment rate. This would mean that the 
multiplier was high during the first couple of years of our sample and decrease over time. 
There has been much research on the issue of interest rate, zero lower bound, and 
the government spending multiplier. I talked about some of the most critical works on 
this topic in Chapter 2, so I will not go over the issue again from the purely theoretical 
perspective, but let's look at how the interest rate behaved over the followed years. The 
Federal Reserve System was run by three different people over the time frame, Ben 
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Bernanke, Janet Yellen, and Jerome Powell. Ben Bernanke, as the Chair of the Federal 
Reserve, along with the Board of Governors, decided to do what had not been done that 
many times in US history. Lower the interest rates to direct proximity of zero. The 
thinking was that such a move would spur private investment and spending and help to 
get the economy back on track. At the same time, such a move theoretically can increase 
the effectiveness of the fiscal policy. Zero lower bound maintained its status quo until 
2016 when FED that was run by Janet Yellen at that point decided to start progressively 
increasing the rates, and the same strategy is still being used. When connecting this 
information to the size of the multiplier, once again, the story sounds the same. During 
the initial years, the multiplier should be higher as the interest rate is low and get smaller 
over time with the increases in interest rate. It is essential to point out that I use the 10-
Year Treasury Constant Maturity Minus 2-Year Treasury Constant Maturity, as seen in 
Figure 5. The reason I do so is following Swanson and Williams (2014), who said that the 
1-year and 2-year treasury bills were unconstrained from 2008 to 2010. For my results, it 
is optimal that the regime does not change as my model is not capable of differentiating 
and secondly, long-term investments are often based on long-term interest rates, and 
therefore, the inclusion of both interest rates will capture better the interest rate that is 
used as the rationale for such investments.
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Chapter 6: Results 
As mentioned, I will estimate three different multipliers three different 
estimations. The first one, as done by Blanchard and Perotti, includes real values of 
government spending, net taxes, and GDP, the second one expands the variable list by 
including the interest rate, and the third one uses real government spending, net taxes, 
and value added without the FIRE industry. I do not use a regime-switching model; 
therefore, I will present linear multipliers. I will show three estimates for all 
specifications, the initial shock, after eight periods and after 20 periods to see the initial 
impact, short-run multiplier, and long-run multiplier. All the estimates are cumulative 
multipliers for the given period and can be found in Table 3. 
According to the theory and literature, as presented in Chapters 2 and 3, I assume 
that the multiplier will be lower than unity as there has not been substantial evidence 
towards a multiplier higher than one after the Great Recession. The theory would dictate 
that the multiplier should be higher during these years since the US economy was facing 
zero overnight interest rates, however, as Swanson and Williams (2014) show in their 
work, the interest rates were not constrained during the first years after the recession 
when the most forceful spending occurred. The works that found the multiplier to be 
higher than unity mostly focused on different types of government spending such as 
investment or employed cross-state models. Since I do not follow either of those
 57 
methodologies, the multiplier should be in line with Ramey's findings (2019). A different 
story could unfold when looking at the impact of government spending on the added
value without the FIRE industries. Following a Classical-Keynesian line of thinking, 
Duncan Foley (2011) differentiates between value-creating or productive sectors of the 
economy and unproductive ones. Having identified the Finance Insurance Real Estate 
(FIRE) industries as unproductive ones, he demonstrated that the severity of the recession 
was deeper than the official measures once the unproductive sectors (the FIRE) excluded 
from GDP calculation. The inclusion of the FIRE industries inflates the value of GDP 
and in turn, makes the recession look less severe. With the multiplier, such occurrence 
could lead to a higher multiplier as the spending will be directly used for production and 
consumption. 
 First, I employ the Blanchard-Perotti (BT) SVAR specification. I order my 
variables through Cholesky decomposition in the following order: government spending, 
GDP, net taxes. My results show a multiplier with the initial impact of 2 in the first 
quarter, going down to 1.6 after eight quarters, and after 20 quarters (5 years), the 
cumulative multiplier is 0.5. This shows that government spending is effective in the 
initial quarters, but over time, it diminishes and drops below unity. This goes hand in 
hand with the current research as well as the estimates from the CBO, as described in 
Chapter 3. When using BT transformation, Ramey's criticism seems valid as the 
multiplier is higher at every single period. All the results can be found in Table 4.   
 When employing my extended version of the BT specification where I included 
an interest rate that is ordered last, I find that the multiplier is slightly higher than during 
when not included. The initial impact is 2.8, after eight periods it is 1.3 and lands at 0.9 
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after 20 periods. This points to the fact that despite the monetary policy not being 
constrained, there was friction in the money market that allowed the fiscal policy act in a 
greater manner than it would have without it. After transforming using the BT 
transformation, I once again get a higher multiplier.  
 Lastly, I employ the BT specification, but I use value added without FIRE 
industries instead of GDP to assess how the government spending affected these 
industries. My findings follow what was implied by Foley in his work, government 
spending multiplier is higher without FIRE industries in calculations. I find the impact 
multiplier to be 2, similarly to overall economy, however, after 8 periods, the multiplier is 
2.3 and after 20 periods, it is 1.7. This finding shows that not only the state of the 
economy, type of spending or methodology affect the size of the multiplier, but a simple 
choice of which industries receive the money makes a great difference as the multiplier 
reflects the creation of value and in turn income.  
 In summary, my results confirm what was to be assumed based on the chosen 
assumptions, methodology and previous research. The overall cumulative multiplier was 
not higher than unity after 5 years, zero lower bound had an effect on the size of the 
multiplier but not as great as could be assumed from the theory and the direction of 
spending makes a difference.  
 Importantly, when testing the model, using the first specification, I cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that states that government spending has no effect on the output, 
however, for the remaining specifications, I can reject it and say that the government 
spending has an effect on the output.
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Conclusion  
After the Great Recession, the interest in the effects of fiscal policy has picked up 
speed and that showed in the number of papers and reports written on the size of the 
government spending multiplier. A greater insight into such complicated subject would 
be of great help not only to push the economic theory forward, but also to improve the 
handling of government funds and how they should be spent. This debate has been going 
on for decades since the modern macroeconomics originated, from Keynes to Friedman 
to Barro, Ramey, Krugman and many others, however, a clear conclusion has never been 
made. This is due to multiple factors such as simple theoretical background that leads to 
different sized multipliers, the choice of the spending shock, methodology, or practical 
things such as timing, type of the spending and its direction.  
Based on this unclarity, I decided to put together a summary of main theoretical 
frameworks dealing with government spending and how the agents in the economy 
respond to it. I show that the main assumption affecting the size of the multiplier is the 
assumption of rationality as it dictates whether people will spend the additional income in 
the same or following period, or whether they decide to smooth their consumption over 
future periods which decreases the size of the multiplier. To compare the theoretical and 
empirical world, I do a review of some of the main works on this topic and I find that 
SVAR models generate higher estimates than the DSGE models. The reason is that the
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DSGE models are based on theory and the modern New Keynesian theory combines both 
New Classical and Keynesian assumptions.
 Regarding the empirical analysis in this study,  I follow up on the traditional 
specification by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and expand it by adding interest rate and 
different transformation of elasticities to multipliers. Here, I test whether my results will 
be similar to theirs due to the similarity in models and whether Ramey’s remarks over the 
false BT transformation are appropriate. I find that even when applying modern data, my 
results are fairly similar to the ones by Blanchard and Perotti, high impact multiplier that 
decreases slightly below unity. By adding interest rate in the model, I test the assumption 
of a higher multiplier during constant, low interest periods. I find that the multiplier is 
indeed higher than unity as theory would presume, but not by as much as some of the 
works would say. Lastly, I test the impact of government spending on the added value of 
all the sectors without the FIRE industries. I find that the government spending multiplier 
is higher for the overall economy once the unproductive sectors such as FIRE, as called 
by Foley (2011) are excluded. Foley’s analysis along with the multiplier analysis shows 
that the unproductive segments of the economy must receive and consume some of the 
income generated by fiscal policy and the multiplier process. Once we take the 
unproductive sectors out of the equation, we can see the real size of the generated income 
and the multiplier process. 
The research on this topic still has a long road ahead. For example, the type of 
government spending is another issue to deal with. It has been shown that there are 
certain types of spending such as investment or transfers that produce higher multipliers, 
however, it has not really been looked into which sectors of the economy benefit from it 
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the most. Regarding my work, it would be beneficial to expand the data set in order to 
tighten the confidence intervals and also, possibly implement a regime-switching model 
and make certain assumptions about the output gap. 
In my work, I showed the differences in theoretical approaches and how they 
affect the size of the multiplier. Then, I showed how economists and researchers dealt 
with this topic using their models and assumptions. Last, I create my own model to test 
whether my results will be similar to the original model to show how important the 
methodology and assumptions are for the results and then I expand it by adding two new 
variables, interest rate and value added without the FIRE industries. My results indicate 
that methodology is, indeed, one of the main factors regarding the multiplier and so is the 
choice of variables. 
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Appendix 
Figures 
Figure 1 Real GDP per Capita 
 
Source: NIPA Table 1.1.6. Real Gross Domestic Product, Chained Dollars & Fed St. 
Louis, Total Population: All Ages including Armed Forces Overseas (POP) & Fed St. 
Louis Civilian Unemployment Rate [UNRATE] 
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Figure 2 Real GDP per Capita Growth 
 
Source: NIPA Table 1.1.6. Real Gross Domestic Product, Chained Dollars & Fed St. 
Louis, Total Population: All Ages including Armed Forces Overseas (POP) & Fed St. 
Louis Civilian Unemployment Rate [UNRATE] 
  
-0.6%
-0.4%
-0.2%
0.0%
0.2%
0.4%
0.6%
0.8%
1.0%
1.2%
2
0
0
9
-0
1
-0
1
2
0
0
9
-0
5
-0
1
2
0
0
9
-0
9
-0
1
2
0
1
0
-0
1
-0
1
2
0
1
0
-0
5
-0
1
2
0
1
0
-0
9
-0
1
2
0
1
1
-0
1
-0
1
2
0
1
1
-0
5
-0
1
2
0
1
1
-0
9
-0
1
2
0
1
2
-0
1
-0
1
2
0
1
2
-0
5
-0
1
2
0
1
2
-0
9
-0
1
2
0
1
3
-0
1
-0
1
2
0
1
3
-0
5
-0
1
2
0
1
3
-0
9
-0
1
2
0
1
4
-0
1
-0
1
2
0
1
4
-0
5
-0
1
2
0
1
4
-0
9
-0
1
2
0
1
5
-0
1
-0
1
2
0
1
5
-0
5
-0
1
2
0
1
5
-0
9
-0
1
2
0
1
6
-0
1
-0
1
2
0
1
6
-0
5
-0
1
2
0
1
6
-0
9
-0
1
2
0
1
7
-0
1
-0
1
2
0
1
7
-0
5
-0
1
2
0
1
7
-0
9
-0
1
2
0
1
8
-0
1
-0
1
2
0
1
8
-0
5
-0
1
2
0
1
8
-0
9
-0
1
 71 
Figure 3 Real Government Spending per Capita 
 
Source: NIPA Table 3.1. Government Current Receipts and Expenditures & Fed St. 
Louis, Total Population: All Ages including Armed Forces Overseas (POP) & Fed St. 
Louis Civilian Unemployment Rate [UNRATE] 
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Figure 4 Civilian Unemployment Rate 
 
Source: Fed St. Louis Civilian Unemployment Rate [UNRATE] 
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Figure 5 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate 
 
Source Fed St. Louis 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate [TB3MS] 
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Figure 6 Impulse Response, Estimation 1 
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Figure 7 Impulse Response, Estimation 2 
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Figure 8 Impulse Response, Estimation 3 
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Figure 9 Cumulative Multiplier, Specification 1 
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Figure 10 Cumulative Multiplier, Specification 2 
 
  
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
OIRF BT Transformation
 79 
Figure 11 Cumulative Multiplier, Specification 3 
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Tables 
Table 1 Aggregate Multipliers by Models and Linearity 
Author Methodology Linearity Country Results 
(Blanchard & 
Perotti, An 
Empirical 
Characterization 
of the Dynamic 
Effects of 
Changes in 
Government 
Spending and 
Taxes on 
Output, 2002) 
SVAR Linear US Spending 
Multiplier = 0.9 
to 1.29 
Barro and 
Redlick (2011) 
Time Series Linear US Temporary 
Multiplier = 
0.4-0.5 
Permanent 
Multiplier = 
0.5-0.6 
(Gali, Valles, & 
Lopez-Sallido, 
2007) 
SVAR Linear US Spending 
Multiplier = 
0.78-1.74 
 81 
(Forni, 
Monteforte, & 
Sessa, 2009) 
NK-DSGE Linear Euro Area The biggest 
impact lies 
with direct 
transfers to 
households. 
(Auerbach & 
Gorodnichenko, 
2012) 
RSVAR Non-linear OECD Recession 
Multiplier = 2.3  
Expansion 
Multiplier ≈ 
0 
(Thomakos, 
2012) 
RSVAR Non-linear Greece Recession 
Multiplier = 
1.32  
Expansion 
Multiplier ≈ 
0 
(De Cos & 
Moral-Benito, 
2013) 
RSVAR Non-linear Spain Recession 
Multiplier = 1.4 
Expansion 
Multiplier ≈ 
0.6 
 82 
(Ramey & 
Zubairy, 2018) 
Jorda’s local 
projections 
Non-linear US Recession and 
Expansion 
Multiplier = 0.6 
ZLB multiplier 
= 1.5 (at its 
peak with 
certain 
specifications) 
(Baum, 
Poplawski-
Ribeiro, & 
Weber, 2012) 
TVAR Non-linear G7 without 
Italy 
Negative 
output gap = 
1.7 
Positive output 
gap < 0 (US) 
(Eggertson, 
2011) 
NK-DSGE Non-linear US Non-ZLB = 0.5 
ZLB = 2.3 
(Christiano, 
Eichenbaum, & 
Rebelo, 2011) 
CNK-DSGE Non-linear US Non-ZLB < 1 
ZLB = 1.6 – 
2.3 
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Table 2 ARRA Multipliers by Cross-state Dependency 
Author Cross-state focus Results 
(Congressional 
Budget Office, 
2015) 
National 
Aggregate 
Purchases of Goods and Services = 
0.5 – 2.5  
Transfers to State and Local 
Government for Infrastructure = 0.4 – 
2.2 
Transfers for other purposes = 0.4 – 
1.8 
Transfers to Individuals = 0.4 – 2.1 
Onetime Payments to Retirees = 0.2 – 
1.0 
(Cogan, 2010) National 
Aggregate 
Spending Multiplier = 0.6 – 0.7 
(Drautzburg & 
Uhlig, 2015) 
National 
Aggregate 
Spending Multiplier = 0.5  
(Feyrer & 
Sacerdote, 2011) 
National 
Aggregate and 
State-Cross 
Aggregate Multiplier = 0.47 
Cross-state Multiplier = 1.06 
The biggest impact lies with transfers 
to low-income households 
 84 
(Oh & Reis, 
2011) 
National 
Aggregate 
Aggregate Multiplier = 0.06 
(Chodorow-
Reich, 2019) 
National 
Aggregate and 
State-Cross 
Aggregate Multiplier > 1.8 
Cross-state multiplier > 1.8 
(Ramey, 2019) National 
Aggregate and 
State-Cross 
Aggregate Multiplier= 0.9 
(Batini, Eyraud, 
Forni, & Weber, 
2014) 
Model-based Spending Multiplier = 1.0 – 1.4 
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Table 3 Cumulative Multiplier, Own Results 
Specification # OIRF BT Transformation 
Specification 1 Initial shock =  2.0 
After 8 quarters = 1.6 
After 20 quarters = 0.5 
Initial shock =  2.9 
After 8 quarters = 2.3 
After 20 quarters = 0.7 
Specification 2 Initial shock = 2.6 
After 8 quarters = 1.3 
After 20 quarters = 0.9 
Initial shock =  3.7 
After 8 quarters = 1.9 
After 20 quarters = 1.3 
Specification 3 Initial shock = 2.0 
After 8 quarters = 2.3 
After 20 quarters.= 1.7 
Initial shock =  3.0 
After 8 quarters = 3.5 
After 20 quarters = 2.5 
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Table 4 VAR Specification 1 
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Table 5 Granger Causality Wald Test Specification 1 
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Table 6 VAR Specification 2 
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Table 7 Granger Causality Wald Test Specification 2 
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Table 8 VAR Specification 3 
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Table 9 Granger Causality Wald Test Specification 3 
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Table 10 ARRA expenditures, initial estimates 
 ARRA ($ 
billions) 
Relief for Families $260 
Health Care $138 
Education $117 
Infrastructure $83 
Small Businesses $54 
Alternative Energy $22 
Science Research $18 
Other $95 
Source https://www.thebalance.com/arra-details-3306299 
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Table 11 Output Gap 
Quarter Output Gap 
2009q1 -875.70 
2009q2 -948.80 
2009q3 -940.90 
2009q4 -818.10 
2010q1 -799.70 
2010q2 -698.00 
2010q3 -624.20 
2010q4 -588.20 
2011q1 -675.20 
2011q2 -614.70 
2011q3 -673.50 
2011q4 -547.20 
2012q1 -481.00 
2012q2 -474.50 
2012q3 -517.80 
2012q4 -566.70 
2013q1 -492.30 
2013q2 -542.70 
2013q3 -486.00 
2013q4 -426.70 
 94 
2014q1 -540.90 
2014q2 -405.70 
2014q3 -276.00 
2014q4 -270.30 
2015q1 -205.00 
2015q2 -139.50 
2015q3 -174.70 
2015q4 -234.10 
2016q1 -243.00 
2016q2 -217.60 
2016q3 -206.80 
2016q4 -202.70 
2017q1 -197.10 
2017q2 -138.60 
2017q3 -88.70 
2017q4 -64.40 
2018q1 -48.40 
2018q2 48.90 
2018q3 108.30 
2018q4 111.70 
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Table 12 Full Estimates for Elasticities and Multipliers, Specification 1 
Specification 
1, periods 
Elasticity 
G on G 
Elasticity 
G on Y 
OIRF 
Multiplier 
BT 
Multiplier 
0 0.193535 0.353435 2.0253013 2.92147435 
1 0.188572 0.336137 1.97336459 2.84655623 
2 0.217053 0.401301 2.271412 3.27648628 
3 0.150139 0.50682 1.57117168 2.26639748 
4 0.172373 0.457428 1.80384561 2.60202701 
5 0.19193 0.481427 2.00850532 2.89724635 
6 0.141597 0.480663 1.48178153 2.13745319 
7 0.16852 0.434563 1.76352481 2.54386471 
8 0.152939 0.42826 1.60047307 2.3086644 
9 0.131993 0.393706 1.38127777 1.99247766 
10 0.140747 0.356056 1.47288646 2.12462216 
11 0.115139 0.331666 1.20490436 1.738061 
12 0.107724 0.291629 1.12730802 1.62612914 
13 0.103148 0.259659 1.07942118 1.55705292 
14 0.085464 0.229956 0.894362 1.29010713 
15 0.082487 0.196584 0.86320835 1.24516834 
16 0.073709 0.170797 0.77134851 1.11266155 
 96 
17 0.064228 0.144897 0.67213192 0.96954274 
18 0.06104 0.120961 0.6387702 0.92141883 
19 0.053174 0.101533 0.55645424 0.80267898 
20 0.048343 0.082536 0.50589888 0.72975345 
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Table 13 Full Estimates for Elasticities and Multipliers, Specification 2 
Specification 
2,  periods 
Elasticity 
G on G 
Elasticity 
G on Y 
OIRF 
Multiplier 
BT 
Multiplier 
0 0.226417 0.330158 2.57069464 3.65880549 
1 0.244052 0.298869 2.77091901 3.94377983 
2 0.267629 0.365147 3.03860768 4.32477444 
3 0.196288 0.467135 2.22861583 3.17193325 
4 0.208547 0.451832 2.36780213 3.37003365 
5 0.171737 0.453641 1.94986854 2.7751992 
6 0.138623 0.427334 1.57389862 2.2400906 
7 0.161276 0.375394 1.83109638 2.60615375 
8 0.115008 0.330827 1.30577849 1.85848192 
9 0.109859 0.250073 1.24731775 1.7752762 
10 0.111016 0.189749 1.2604541 1.79397285 
11 0.0717 0.116669 0.81406787 1.15864248 
12 0.081364 0.030005 0.92379105 1.31480874 
13 0.068446 -
0.032676 
0.77712259 1.10605918 
14 0.054608 -
0.108167 
0.62000863 0.88244279 
 98 
15 0.065993 -
0.173078 
0.7492717 1.06641971 
16 0.053319 -0.22159 0.60537357 0.86161308 
17 0.059876 -
0.272571 
0.67982047 0.9675715 
18 0.067852 -
0.301621 
0.77037843 1.09646038 
19 0.064992 -
0.322284 
0.73790654 1.05024396 
20 0.08012 -
0.334621 
0.90966692 1.29470621 
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Table 14 Full Estimates for Elasticities and Multipliers, Specification 3 
Specification 
3, periods 
Elasticity 
G on G 
Elasticity 
G on Y 
OIRF 
Multiplier 
BT 
Multiplier 
0 0.198945 0.353314 2.0126704 3.00416856 
1 0.241024 0.33833 2.43837176 3.63958242 
2 0.280879 0.407135 2.84157354 4.24141276 
3 0.216893 0.524257 2.19424525 3.2751923 
4 0.260371 0.472231 2.6340999 3.93173175 
5 0.266474 0.489814 2.69584223 4.02389009 
6 0.199898 0.483495 2.02231163 3.01855934 
7 0.243811 0.433339 2.46656705 3.6816675 
8 0.231446 0.418315 2.34147384 3.49494985 
9 0.211271 0.37784 2.13736906 3.1902973 
10 0.230657 0.33569 2.33349175 3.48303555 
11 0.21 0.302455 2.12451071 3.17110457 
12 0.205289 0.257793 2.07685085 3.09996612 
13 0.204323 0.22014 2.06707811 3.08537904 
14 0.189586 0.184078 1.91798804 2.862843 
15 0.188299 0.148039 1.90496782 2.84340866 
16 0.182215 0.118401 1.84341771 2.75153723 
 100 
17 0.17531 0.090382 1.77356178 2.64726829 
18 0.17349 0.066173 1.75514935 2.61978539 
19 0.168056 0.046065 1.70017511 2.53772928 
20 0.164763 0.028302 1.66686075 2.48800334 
 
 
